Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.
Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/567773
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MILITARY POLICE
Training at NTC was largely what we expected. The sce-
nario was complex, and the operational tempo was rapid.
Once again, we put our to the test. The rear area
grew quickly; as such, forces were spread over a large area.
Due to unreliable FM communication, orders from head-
quarters were often short and primarily consisted of key
tasks, the commander's intent, and the desired end state.
Since we did not have constant guidance, we relied heavily
upon mission command and the trust that was built during
prerotation training. Ultimately, we had a very successful
rotation and a smooth integration with the BEB and 3d Ar-
mored BCT, 4th Infantry Division.
We learned several lessons during the MTX and NTC ro-
tation:
• Our initial training objectives were nearsighted. There
are several ways to conduct zone reconnaissance, but
none can be communicated effectively if we cannot con-
duct troop leading procedures effciently. Training at
NTC demonstrated that additional emphasis should be
placed on systems effcacy—not how a task is conducted.
• Flexibility is impossible without mission command, and
mission command is impossible without trust. We needed
to foster trust with the BEB to have the latitude to oper-
ate effciently. I had to trust my leaders to execute orders
with resources that were not organically theirs.
• Bottom-up refnement of the mission is key to ownership.
Early and frequent involvement in the planning process
made it easy to execute the mission when the fnal order
was produced.
• Learning the language of the supported unit is important.
During our rotation, we supported engineer; explosive
ordnance disposal; chemical, biological, radiological, nu-
clear, and high-yield explosives reconnaissance; infantry;
armor; psychological operations; military intelligence;
and civil affairs elements. Doctrine provided a common
language, but some common understanding and learning
were necessary to bridge the gap between branches.
• Mission analysis allowed the proactive identifcation of
methods of employment. As the fght developed on the
ground, we understood where gaps existed and commu-
nicated our method of support to higher headquarters.
• Our rear detachment support was inadequate. We should
have provided more resources to conduct services and
scheduled maintenance while the company was at NTC.
Our experience supporting the 3d Armored BCT, 4th In-
fantry Division, was overwhelmingly positive. Our Soldiers
obtained a better understanding of combined arms maneu-
ver, hybrid threat, and the expeditionary operating environ-
ment. The lessons learned through training could not be
replicated without the opportunity to train at the BCT level.
is the of the 110th Military Police
deployed BCT
during MRX Iron Horse Focus in August 2014 and NTC rotation
9)
to a comprehensive after action review, which was used to
refne procedures, training, and equipping.
Note: Details of the incident described in this article were
obtained by the authors through media reports and inter-
views with participating military police personnel, CID
agents, and Polizei. Some portions of the military police
report were cleared for release via a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request. All information presented in this article
complies with the Privacy Act of 1974, and information that
was withheld was done so in accordance with Chapter III of
Army Regulation (AR) 25-55, The of the
Endnotes:
1
Operational Law Handbook, International and Operational
Law Department, Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, 2014, p. 126.
2
"Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Trea-
ty Regarding the Status of Their Forces," Article VII, NATO,
19 June 1951,