Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.
Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/567773
MILITARY POLICE 14 gap between tactical and operational levels of war with one foot forward, commanding the tactical fght, and the other foot to the rear as an operational command. To support the maneuver fght, III Corps detached a portion of the corps staff from the main command post to operate the CSCP, which was commanded by Brigadier Tim Lai (United King- dom), the Deputy Commanding General for Support. This command post provided the overarching authority for mis- sion command in the combat support area (CSA) and joint security area (JSA). According to Brigadier Lai, "The role of the CSCP was to synchronize and integrate the sustain- ment, protection, and engagement warfghting functions to most effectively support the overall scheme of maneuver. The CSCP also provides mission command for a wide range of operations across the CSA and JSA. The CSCP improves general offcer oversight of functions or activities that tradi- tionally want for attention." In addition to focusing on synchronizing warfghting functions in support of decisive action, the CSCP facilitated mission command in the CSA and JSA. According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, and JP 3-31, - tions, if the CJFLCC is responsible for the JSA, it may es- tablish a joint security coordination center. The III Corps CSCP flled many of the roles of a joint security coordina- tion center. With no staff or physical resources authorized by the modifed table of organization and equipment to es- tablish a third command post, III Corps relied on support from the separate brigades in the CSA. For WFX 15-03, the CSCP was integrated with the Headquarters, 648th Maneu- ver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), Georgia Army National Guard. The inherent capacity of the MEB to conduct mission command of maneuver units, terrain management, air and ground movement control, targeting, clearance of fres, and support area operations supplied the capacities the CSCP required to provide support to decisive action. With the MEB responsible for execution of terrain man- agement, security, and movement within the CSA and JSA, Brigadier Lai and corps enablers provided the authority and additional resources beyond the capabilities of the MEB. Colonel Ronald T. Cuffee Sr., the III Corps provost marshal, observed, "The CSCP reminds me of the old rear area opera- tions center on steroids due to the robust capability of the MEB, additional corps staff representatives, and the subor- dinate unit liaison offcers led by the Deputy Commanding General for Support." WFX 15-03 was the frst exercise for the CSCP. It operated at the crawl phase—its infrastruc- ture and manning were immature. Future exercises may see III Corps staff augment the CSCP with liaison offcers and staff from other units (Medical Command, Transportation Command, Theater Sustainment Command, Expeditionary Sustainment Command, and other separate commands or major separate corps units within the JSA and CSA). Also within the CSA and JSA, the 89th Military Police Brigade worked closely with the 648th MEB and the CSCP to support III Corps. The 89th Military Police Brigade conducted security and mobility support, response force operations, detention operations, and security force assis- tance using assessments and partnerships. As the exercise progressed, the division rear boundaries moved forward, ex- tending the CSA. This challenged the MEB and the military police brigade, stretching fnite resources over vast distanc- es. The potential need was identifed for an additional MEB to enable the CJFLCC to divide responsibilities, assigning one MEB to the CSA and another MEB to the JSA. Also, a corps that is tasked as the ground component commander with responsibility for all detention operations in theater, may deploy multiple military police detention battalions. This may exceed the scope of command of one military police brigade, and the CJFLCC may request a second military po- lice brigade headquarters. The increase in available military police forces also en- ables commanders to look beyond the offensive and defen- sive operations and set conditions early for a successful transition to stability operations. Preventing a civil security vacuum is crucial to stability operations. In conducting decisive action, offensive and defensive actions cannot be applied in isolation. The application of offensive and defensive actions must be tempered by the obligation to protect the civilian population. In Operation Iraqi Free- dom, V Corps planned and executed Phase III operations extremely well. However, by the end of major combat opera- tions, the Iraqi security forces and government infrastruc- ture were decimated and unable to secure local populations. Criminal, terrorist, and insurgent groups in the absence of police and other security forces. The change to the total Army analysis and the elevation of the echelon of military police forces allocated to each commander will en- able brigades and divisions to assess local security forces and provide security to the population, while the CJFLCC develops priorities for building partner capacity. A critical enabling component is police intelligence operations. Early and detailed police intelligence is critical to identi- fying and resolving primary sources of instability, establish- ing security, and setting the conditions for the withdrawal of coalition forces. 2 III Corps used WFX 15-03 to develop the CRIMINT collection process. Before WFX 15-03 and at the request of the III Corps provost marshal, the 11th Military Police Battalion (CID) provided a CRIMINT analyst to sup- port the exercise and assist in the development of the corps CRIMINT collection and analysis process. Together, the corps PMO and CRIMINT analyst team developed an inter- nal process for corps-wide signifcant actions, open source analysis, key leader engagement reports, and military police intelligence reporting from the 89th Military Police Brigade and division provost marshals combined with open source collection and analysis. The night battle captain and battle noncommissioned offcer processed and compiled reports, which reduced the analyst's workload and enabled him to fo- cus on establishing links and associations. By the end of the exercise, III Corps PMO, in coordination with the III Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) and 89th Mili- tary Police Brigade, established the groundwork for a corps (Continued on page 16)