Military Police

Spring 2013

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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dismounted partnered patrols were conducted through these volatile areas on a nightly basis until eventually the familiarity, capability, and con¿dence of the AUP had improved to the point that it was able to lead the patrols. This facilitated the introduction of the Afghan-sustainable variables of the ABP and the ANA into the AUP patrols. Because most Afghan police tend to feel "enabled" in the presence of coalition forces (due to enhanced capability, force protection, and life support), partnered patrols can be used to immediately build con¿dence. However, if left unchecked, partnered patrols can also tend to create a sense of dependency. Therefore, it was important to proceed to step 2 as quickly as possible. Step 2: Combined Patrols (Partnered, Then Quick-Reaction Force) In conjunction with the SFATs/SFAATs, advisors emphasized the importance of coordinated efforts among ABP and ANA units. At ¿rst, this initiative met with resistance from ABP and ANA commanders, who were reluctant to commit forces to daily or "routine" security patrols—a commitment that could be expected to result in arguments regarding mission command, logistics support, and requirements for obtaining the approval of higher headquarters before mission execution. However, after a few weeks of heavy emphasis on the program, the commanders agreed to oblige their mentors by conducting one or two combined, unilateral patrols while coalition forces maintained a quick-reaction force (QRF). Weekly security shuras, hosted by the ABP and ANA commanders, directly facilitated communication and coordination among the senior commanders, which indirectly (without their realization) and slowly developed into a working relationship. Together, the commanders began to realize that coordination and cooperation resulted in increased situational awareness, an improved ability to project forces and logistics, and less enemy contact (since enemy forces rarely attacked when faced with overwhelming ¿repower). But the relationship was not always that simple. On multiple occasions, one of the commanders simply refused to work with the group due to emotional frustration, a disagreement, an order from higher headquarters, or the like. However, the 549th Military Police Company and the SFAT/SFAAT advisors remained committed to ensuring that every meeting, every shura, and every plan involved multiple Afghan agencies. Although the ABP and ANA may not have always wanted to work with their counterparts, they soon realized that—to maximize coalition force capabilities—they would need to do so. Eventually, the commanders began sitting closer to one another during the regular meetings. Discussions that had once consisted of arguments over minute details evolved into conversations about families and friends. Personal relationships began to develop, and combined coordination became much easier. Step 3: QRFs The ANSF wanted a dedicated coalition QRF, but the Americans wanted to help their Afghan partners only in the event that they needed assistance. To ensure progression toward 18 independent Afghan combined and unilateral operations, the 549th Military Police Company and SFAT/SFAAT advisors opted for a hybrid approach that made use of the partnered patrol concept—but only with the QRF. The involved parties agreed that the overall QRF would consist of ANSF personnel and Soldiers of the 549th Military Police Company. Following a few successful trial runs, the coalition QRF and the ANSF QRF deployed together, but disengaged early. A few weeks later, the coalition QRF again deployed with the ANSF QRF, but served in a tactical oversight role just a terrain feature or two behind the ANSF QRF. The coalition QRF eventually staged itself at the district center or police station and, from there, continued to retrograde toward Forward Operating Base Shinwar. However, as the con¿dence of the Afghans grew, the ANSF QRF didn't seem to notice; they became more and more willing to venture farther away from the coalition QRF and the forward operating base. Step 4: Battlespace Integration Although the ANSF truly planned and led most operations, they did not—and could not—maintain ultimate responsibility as long as coalition forces continued to operate in separate operations centers, coordinating and using assets that are not typically at the disposal of the Afghans. Therefore, once the Shinwar District combined tactical operations center was established, Afghans became the battlespace owners and the coalition forces supplied personnel to manage coalition force assets. Moving 549th Military Police Company operations into the combined tactical operations center resulted not only in a physical change, but also a psychological one. The ABP and ANA commanders felt culturally comfortable taking charge in their controlled environment; they felt empowered. To validate the battlespace integration concept, the 549th Military Police Company and the SFATs/SFAATs needed a platform that would test not only the concept, but also the capability of their Afghan partner—and then came Toufan 29. Culminating Event: Toufan 29 The Afghans received a cipher ordering them to conduct a combined operation in Lal Pur District to disrupt insurgent forces operating in various villages within the district (including Raqmadi, Suray, and Yaqobi) before the arrival of Ramadan. From the beginning, the 549th Military Police Company and the advisors agreed: Toufan 29 would be an Afghan operation—planned, coordinated, and executed by the ANA, ABP, and AUP according to the Afghan timeline and using Afghan assets. This presented an opportunity for the Afghans to simultaneously assume responsibility for all three lines of effort—with ANA, ABP, and AUP commanders and the Lal Pur District governor having a vested interest in the plan. Despite their irregular planning process and, at times, hasty decisionmaking, the Afghans managed (without coalition force support) to discuss, develop, and rehearse a plan that involved political and military objectives. The governor needed to demonstrate GIRoA inÀuence and capability during visits to outlying villages, and the military wanted to conduct a show of force. What had started out on paper 3 weeks earlier as a coalition force-inÀuenced plan involving clearing operations MILITARY POLICE . 19-13-1

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