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Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/115206
and signifcant coalition force and advisor presence turned
into an Afghan-led presence patrol with the district governor.
The presence patrol was conducted with no coalition force
presence or support, and the schedule followed a realistic
Afghan timeline.
On the day of the Toufan 29 operation, the 549th Military
Police Company and the advisors deliberately delayed their
departure to ensure that they arrived at the end of the operation.
And as they approached a large crowd that had gathered under
a shack-like structure, they observed the district governor
and the commanders speaking to seated Raqmadi residents,
who were listening intently. With their own resources and
without coalition force support, the Afghans had managed
to travel to a remote village in a volatile district and leaders
were interacting with village residents—actively listening to
the concerns and challenges expressed by various elders of the
community. Remaining out of sight and irrelevant, the 549th
Military Police Company refected on the previous 3 weeks of
planning, advising, compromise, and frustration.
Although Toufan 29 did not constitute a major clearing
operation (and seemed more like a combined presence patrol
than anything else) and did not brief well on paper, the results
indicated otherwise. The following day, Raqmadi residents
traveled to the district center to speak with the governor; some
stated that this was their frst trip to the district center in more
than 10 years. Confdence surged throughout the ranks of the
ANSF. Nearly all Afghan junior leaders indicated that the lack
of enemy contact was due to the insurgents "running away in
fear."
Unbeknownst to the Afghan commanders, the 549th
Military Police Company and the advisors had tirelessly
worked behind the scenes to help ensure the success of the
Afghans. Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and close
air support assets intensively scoured the objective area before
and during the operation to confrm the absence of insurgents.
These assets were also fully prepared to provide immediate
and overwhelming frepower should the Afghans need it. These
efforts allowed the ANSF commanders and district governor to
develop strength and confdence, which showed as they walked
and talked together and sat next to one another during shuras.
AUP, ABP, and ANA personnel also worked shohna ba shohna
(shoulder to shoulder), as if they were part of the same Afghan
unit. The confdence gained by the Afghans was important
because they needed to believe that they had "won"—and at
the completion of the operation, they did. Subsequently, the
549th Military Police Company did too.
Endnote:
T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles," Arab Bulletin,
20 August 1917.
1
Captain Riddle is the commander, 549th Military Police
Company, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He was stationed at Forward
Operating Base Shinwar from January 2012 to January 2013.
He holds a bachelor's degree in science from the U.S. Military
Academy, West Point, New York.
MILITARY POLICE . 19-13-1
("Beyond Culture," continued from page 15)
the gunners pointed their fngers at us and brandished their
weapons. Major General Zamarai looked at me in disbelief
and said, "This is our country!" I could do nothing more than
shake my head.
Cultural experiences and anecdotes from Afghanistan are
not unique to NTM-A police advisors. Many fellow senior offcers, civilian advisors, military contractors, and international
partners also recognized the importance of cross-cultural competencies and understood that their missions and responsibilities went beyond simple cultural awareness and understanding.
And quite frankly, they often went above and beyond anything
that I did in terms of establishing a close-knit relationship with
their Afghan partners. Through the development of such deep,
personable relationships, they earned a tremendous amount of
lifelong gratitude from their Afghan counterparts.
During the time I spent in Afghanistan, I was aware of and
understood the cultural expectations; however, my daily interactions and engagements with my Afghan friends went beyond
that. Through multiple deployments, our leaders continue to be
reminded of the importance of the role of culture in every operation. Furthermore, the Military Police Force 2020 Strategic
Plan recognizes the importance of developing adaptive military police leaders for the future.4 Educated in multiple disciplines and hardened by complex experiences, military police
leaders can help change the cultural mind-set. They can convey the message that mere awareness and understanding are
not enough. We must move beyond that.
Endnotes:
FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 21 April 2009.
According to FM 3-24.2, culture consists of various elements
including history, language, geography, religion, communications, political science, military arts and sciences, sociology,
cultural anthropology, economics, education, art, music and
entertainment, literature, food and drink, psychology, law and
criminal justice, and science and technology. In addressing a
cultural issue or problem, questions must be considered within
each element.
1
2
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
"Development of a Competency Model for Civil-Military
Training," fact sheet, U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 2012.
3
Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan, U.S. Army
Offce of the Provost Marshal General, 2012,