Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.
Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/115206
to escape the communists who had taken over that part of the country. Black marketeering became a major industry; stolen and diverted relief supplies, U.S. government property, and U.S. currency became major items of trade in this illegal operation. Most of the cases handled by what had been the 36th Military Police CID centered on Japanese civilians claiming property that did not belong to them and, conversely, Korean nationals claiming Japanese property.5 One case involving the theft and diversion of U.S. aviation fuel was solved when a Korean seagoing junk (boat) was discovered heading for North Korea with 250 ¿fty-¿ve-gallon barrels of gasoline onboard. Another major case involved an unidenti¿ed colonel who was appointed to the military government and was extorting property from the Japanese who remained in positions of importance. He reportedly received jewels, wood carvings, furs, rare tapestries, and the largest butterÀy collection in the Far East—and shipped them home. The of¿cer was punished and dismissed from the Service.6 From 1947 to 1949, the manpower of the 25th Military Police CID did not exceed two of¿cers and 12 agents. Early on, a normal caseload consisted of four cases per agent at any time. This number later expanded until each agent carried a load of 12 open cases. The Korean National Police Crime Laboratory provided crime laboratory support for the CID agents—at least until 1948, when the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory–Japan reached full capacity. Former CID agent Chief Warrant Of¿cer Three Carl Craig (Retired) recalls the time that he spent attached to the 24th Military Police CID: Everything in Korea during my 1948–49 tour was under 24th Corps. I now recall the confusion that it caused when the numeric designator clashed with the 24th Military Police [CID] that was headquartered in Pusan with the 6th Infantry Division. I was located at Kwangju with the 20th [Infantry Regiment] of the 6th [Infantry Division]. There were two agents assigned to Kwangju out of Pusan: Chester F. Burns and Chester D. Mansker. The of¿ce was located in a former Japanese general's quarters, built during Japan's occupation of Korea from about 1898 to 1945. We had our own kitchen [and] drew rations from ration breakdown, and our meals were prepared by contract Korean cooks and [kitchen patrols]. They brought me into CID from the 6th MP Company as a very young buck sergeant. It wasn't until February 1949, at age 20 and [with] a 1-year age waiver (had to be 21), that I was awarded MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] 301. That was also the same MOS for [counterintelligence] agents at the time. The most signi¿cant cases that I remember were the theft of military motor vehicles of any kind—especially 2½-ton trucks, which were virtually converted overnight to some God-awfullooking bus. The [petroleum, oils, and lubricants] dump was constantly breached by cutting the fences and tunneling under the fence from huts or houses just outside the fence line. Blackmarket of cigarettes was rampant. At a dollar a carton, they were sold for as much as $30 or more. Any kind of food was MILITARY POLICE . 19-13-1 in high demand. The major crime rate was not that bad. There was a very strict nonfraternization policy in effect, and anyone that got caught was reduced to private and, most often, served stockade time for the catch-all violation of a general order. The Àedgling Korean police force was not very much help. Many of them were in cahoots with the thieves—or they merely con¿scated the illicit loot or military payment certi¿cate currency and kept it themselves. Things did get a little better when the area commanders cracked down on them and "a few heads rolled from the top down." Crimes by GIs against GIs [were] almost nonexistent—other than barracks thieves. The amount of money that constituted grand larceny back then was $50. In fact, it was rare that a Soldier had $50 to begin with. CID investigated all fatalities back then, and most were traf¿c-related. Invariably, [a] papasan (slang for elderly male Korean) riding a makeshift bicycle or carrying an "A frame" with a 55-gallon drum on it would veer or walk into the path of a military vehicle. Homicides, in general, were very rare. There were several legitimate rape cases of very young Korean girls that I remember. Others reported as rape were classi¿ed as the failure of payment of the negotiated price for services.7 In June 1949, Koreans elected a new government and the U.S. occupation ended. Most of the U.S. troops were withdrawn, leaving a small KMAG. Endnotes: 1 General Order No. 1, Military and Naval, "Instruments for the Surrender of Japan," U.S. military forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 August 1945. 2 U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) Publication (Pub) 13-4, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume 1 Supplement, Reports of General Douglas MacArthur, 1966, 1994. 3 Personal correspondence with Mr. Carl Hoerman (a former member of the 31st Field Artillery Battalion Military Police), 5 March 2012. 4 Personal correspondence with Sergeant Major Burton Murrow (a former member of the 207th Military Police Company), 10 March 2012. 5 William Schickhardt, "Unit History—25th Military Police Criminal Investigation (USAFIK), January 1945–June 1949." 6 Ibid. Personal correspondence with Chief Warrant Of¿cer Three Carl Craig (Retired), 17 May 2012. 7 Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career ¿eld until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995. 35