Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.
Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/115206
By Colonel Thomas H. Tatum A s the Army and the Military Police Corps Regiment focus on creating the right force for 2020, the thinking once again returns to what is required to be successful and to provide value added in all operational phases, particularly during Phase III decisive combat operations. There is clear recognition and agreement within the Army concerning the value of military police—especially during Phase IV stability operations in the areas of detainee operations, police training and advising, and rule of law support. But there seems to be less discussion and recognition of the military police role in support of decisive combat operations of the future. The Army customarily takes a hard look at the last war that was fought to gain lessons learned for the future employment of forces. There are countless examples of lessons learned concerning the employment of military police in support of decisive operations during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Panama, and Desert Storm. Unfortunately, I do not believe that history has adequately captured the role of military police in support of combat operations during the early days, weeks, and months of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Leading up to the invasion of Iraq, U.S. Central Command and Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners recognized the need for military police forces. They initially identi¿ed three military police brigades to support initial OIF operations, and they actually deployed those three brigade headquarters in advance of the 20 March 2003 invasion. Military police played a key role in supporting early OIF I operations, despite the fact that many of their capabilities were delayed due to changing situations and conditions. This article describes the efforts and experiences of a military police unit that participated in the early days of OIF—the 504th Military Police Battalion, Joint Base LewisMcChord, Washington. The intent is to provide ideas and insights that might be considered for future military police participation in Phase III operations. The article also provides historical support of the current U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) concept of security and mobility support as a critical military police discipline used to enable combat MILITARY POLICE . 19-13-1 power in decisive operations. There were many other military police units on the ground during the early OIF ¿ght; however, it would be impossible for this article to adequately cover the many great contributions of the hundreds of warrior police who participated in OIF I. A more holistic and comprehensive review of the total OIF I military police effort is in order. Most of the planning and preparation for OIF was conducted during the summer and fall of 2002. One of the key Central Command assumptions was that the Iraqi military would not resist; consequently, large-scale surrenders and capitulations were expected. Based on this expectation, CFLCC identi¿ed the need for a robust military police capability to handle hundreds of thousands of enemy prisoners of war. As combat forces moved north, it was also expected that military police would be needed to support stability operations in areas under coalition control before Phase IV operations commenced. Central Command and CFLCC clearly predicted a largescale military police footprint for Phase IV operations. Three military police brigades were ultimately identi¿ed for the support of Phase III and Phase IV operations. However, unlike the situation with Operation Desert Storm, there was little time and capacity available for a large buildup of forces. To bring combat units into the theater more quickly, CFLCC assumed some risk and moved military police units toward the end of the force Àow. Consequently, when the war started, there were signi¿cantly fewer military police units in-theater than had been originally planned. The 504th Military Police Battalion was originally aligned under the 18th Military Police Brigade for deployment; but in January 2003, the battalion was informed that it would be assigned to the 220th Military Police Brigade as part of the 377th Theater Support Command. By February, an invasion of Iraq was clearly looming, but it was evident that military police forces would be delayed. With the help of the 220th Military Police Brigade, the 504th Military Police Battalion advance party traveled by routine rotator Àight, arriving in Kuwait on 20 March 2003—just as ground operations were kicking off and Iraqi ballistic missiles were being ¿red into Kuwait. As a result of the missile attacks, the Kuwait airport was closed 7