Military Police

SPRING 2014

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-1 13 advancement. This self-deprecation contributed to the steady decline of the corrections MOS strength; and 3 years after the policy change (just 10 years after MOS 95C was identifed as overstrength), the number of Soldiers in the corrections MOS was dangerously low. 5 The innovative programs of the 1980s that were designed to lure Soldiers into the corrections MOS were not working. While the number of correctional offcers within state and federal corrections systems swelled, the number of MOS 95C Soldiers fell to an all-time low. In response to the decline, the Military Police Corps initiated a public relations campaign, with incentives to increase awareness and promote the corrections program. Senior military police leaders conducted briefngs in which they described career opportunities and dispelled myths regarding the corrections feld. But the corrections MOS continued to deteriorate, dropping to a worldwide operating strength of 78 percent in 1992. Therefore, the Army immediately implemented several policy changes. All Skill Level 1 MOS 95B military police Soldiers who were eligible for reenlistment and those who were serving in an MOS that was terminated due to the nuclear arms reduction were presented with an ultimatum: reclassify to MOS 95C or separate from the Army. In addition, the restriction for entry into MOS 95C Skill Level 1 was rescinded. 6 Seven years after MOS 95C was initially restructured, young Skill Level 1 Soldiers once again walked the cell blocks, supervising prisoners. While most of the senior NCOs assigned to correctional facilities got their start in the corrections feld as privates, the sergeants who transitioned to the corrections MOS in midcareer never experienced the private-to-inmate phenomenon; consequently, training and mentoring the new privates was a management challenge for those who had transitioned into the MOS. In 1986, senior Army leaders directed that an evaluation of the ACS structure be conducted and that the role of corrections Soldiers in the year 2000 be defned. The major recommendations of the study, which was completed in 1987, were to establish a centralized management offce to oversee the ACS (a recommendation that was also made in a 1970 study) and to adopt a regional correctional facility (RCF) concept. 7 But before the Army could implement these recommendations, the Secretary of Defense, in order to consolidate and conserve resources, mandated a study of all Service correctional programs in 1989. The consolidation of DOD correctional programs was approved in 1990; and by 1992, the number of stateside Army ACS facilities had been reduced to seven. Although neither the mission of the USDB nor that of overseas confnement facilities was drastically changed, the second tier of the ACS was totally eliminated. 8 Moreover, the closure of the U.S. Army Correctional Brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas, eliminated the only centralized correctional facility where Army prisoners were retrained for return to active duty. Throughout the next 12 years, there was an increase in the number of correctional specialists at ACS facilities who deployed in support of contingency operations. They served as advisors for enemy prisoners of war and participated in detainee operations and resettlement operations (see Table 1, page 14). In March 2003, the Secretary of the Army informed the Secretary of Defense of a plan to outsource the operation of military prisons, suggesting that the long-term incarceration of prisoners was not considered a core competency of the Army. The Army would no longer manage prisons, and MOS 95C Soldiers would be reclassifed into other Army MOSs. A few months later, the senior Army staff recommended that the Acting Secretary of the Army reverse this decision. The staff argued that the operation of prisons directly supported the Army core competency of "sustained land dominance under required capability" by providing control in the theater of operations and that it indirectly supported the Army core competency of "shape the security environment and support civil authorities." Collective training and experiential learning opportunities within ACS facilities served to hone the unique skill set that correctional specialists needed to perform detainee operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Correctional specialists who were deployed to Afghanistan and the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, were already incarcerating high-risk detainees and serving as valuable advisors to combatant commanders. Colonel Colleen McGuire, who was then the commandant of the USDB, stated, "Because of their experience at RCF/USDB facilities, [correctional specialists] have developed an eye for what works and what doesn't work. Interpersonal communication and people skills, safe and effective procedures with high-risk inmates, and an experienced understanding of how to operate a facility would undoubtedly ensure greater effciencies in any type of I/R operation. As with any skill, these operations simply can't be learned from a book. We must recognize that abuse, apathy, and gross mistakes come from frustration and a lack of confdence due to inexperience and poor training. An effcient, safe facility comes from Soldiers with confdence, skill, and pride. 95Cs (31Es) do it best." 9 The order to outsource Army corrections was eventually reversed, but the reversal was accompanied by a grand restructuring of the 95C MOS. 10 In a separate personnel action, the Army began modifying enlisted MOS numbers to coincide with the branch numbers associated with commissioned offcers. Commissioned offcers within the Military Police Branch were designated as the 31 series; therefore, on 1 April 2003, MOS 95C was eliminated and Soldiers holding that MOS were reclassifed to MOS 31E. 11 In December 2003, Regular Army military police corrections units began to be restructured for deployment from stateside installations on a rotational basis. In 2004, the 31E correctional specialist title was changed to I/R specialist and the duties were expanded to include not only the supervision of military prisoners, but also the supervision of enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and refugees. In October 2004, the 525th Military Police Battalion (I/R) was activated in Cuba to provide supervision for the high-risk detainees confned at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. In 2005, military police corrections units at the USDB and the RCF at Fort Lewis, Washington, were reorganized, equipped, and scheduled for deployment to Iraq. The frst to deploy to Iraq was the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 508th Military Police Battalion (I/R), Fort Lewis, which Grande_Hussung.1.indd 15 3/21/2014 12:54:59 PM

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