Military Police

SPRING 2014

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/289743

Contents of this Issue

Navigation

Page 19 of 55

18 MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-1 in Afghanistan for a long period of time. 17 Furthermore, the Haqqani is not alone; it is one of "many insurgent and organized crime networks throughout history and around the globe" to serve as security and a rule-of-law provider. 18 The Haqqani network and other irregular opposing forces seek to gain legitimate authority and provide for needs across hierarchies. Social needs are also very important. Jalaluddin Haqqani (the leader of an insurgent group fghting against U.S.- led North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and the government of Afghanistan) put forth great effort to maintain good community relations in Afghanistan. Rent collection provided information about "vital public services, including religious education and health care." 19 The Afghan religious education system offers the perfect forum for fostering family, relationships, and a sense of belonging. In addition, Haqqani "founded a madaris (plural madrassa) network that played a key role in spreading his jihadist world view." 20 In duality, the demonstration of support and civic interaction serves populace needs and threat actor operations. The use of information technology, electronic networks, and social media for social belonging is a recent development. These media enable "people to mobilize and create strategic events at incredible speeds and then dissolve, shift activity, or disappear entirely," while "also creat[ing] second- and third-order ripple effects that can be felt outside the region." 21 For instance, a reporter who live-tweeted about U.S. drone strikes occurring in Yemen garnered quite a Twitter following. 22 Likewise, Haffez Assad, the Syrian president's son—or someone claiming to be him—created a Facebook® post that was liked, shared, and commented on numerous times, garnering a large number of supporters. 23 These examples illustrate how social needs may be met while adversaries engage in perception management as a component of their larger information warfare effort. Needs for esteem are more likely to be met by a willing populace that is not only satisfed, but also pleased with those who are in power. For example, "A grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support." 24 Under these circumstances, the support is not a product of some form of coercion—as that would not meet the needs of achievement, status, or managerial responsibility. In some cases, divergent beliefs help rationalize active support to continue the fulfllment of esteem needs and to proft in order to fulfll lower-order needs—especially biological needs. The issue involving Islam and the use of drugs provides a case in point: Some Islamic scholars contend that Islam bans any dealings with narcotics; others argue that, although it is wrong to consume narcotics, partaking in other aspects of the drug trade to earn money and fght the holy war is acceptable. 25 Self-actualization is far more rare and diffcult to target. It most likely occurs only in isolated instances for select individuals with satisfed esteem needs. Irregular opposing- force actions occur predominantly within the realm of the lower hierarchies, as that is where opposing forces have greatest control. Part Three: Friendly-Force Articulation The implementation of concepts and the execution of objectives within the human domain are important in achieving strategic success. The purpose of this discussion, which describes one way to approach operational implementation, is to serve as a stimulus for further discourse. Considering the identifcation of a shared center of gravity or core of legitimacy with irregular opposing forces, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, and examples of hybrid threat actor engagements, this article moves forward using operational art and examining a paradigm of an interdependent and interoperable structure designed to achieve success in the human domain. The human domain may not be a line of effort (LOE) in itself; however, consideration should be given to using Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs to develop decisive points relative to the human domain. The purpose of decisive points is to fulfll populace needs or to have an operational effect on the ability of the irregular opposing force to fulfll populace needs. Arranging LOEs in ascending order (restoration/development of essential services, security, governance, infrastructure development) and subsequently plotting the human domain- focused decisive points reveal Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. The ability to identify and depict decisive points, achieve decisive point objectives, and uniformly progress along LOEs provides insight into operational effectiveness by answering the question, "Are we doing the right things?" and helps avoid the question, "How did we do so much and achieve so little?" Military action in the human domain may arguably be viewed as a proactive effort, rather than as a fnal instrument of national power. For instance, special operations forces are advocates for a seventh warfghting function which "addresses the related tasks and systems that infuence the behaviors of a people (friendly, neutral, adversary), security forces, and governments and enables the prioritization and synchronization of efforts to achieve strategic effects." 26 The assertion is that this approach allows the Army to leverage its recent wartime experience when performing missions involving unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and security force assistance. Preventing confict is preferable, but proactive involvement also reduces the likelihood of encountering strategic surprises, aggressor miscalculations of friendly capabilities or resolve, or heightened aggressor responsiveness to crises. 27 In a recent article, Colonel Robert Simpson (acting director, Concept Development and Learning Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC]) stated that, in a proactive capacity, "We have the ability not only to compel, but to persuade people in a positive way." 28 Successful engagements in the human domain include interdependent, interoperable strategies. The Strategic Landpower Task Force white paper asserts that "Interdependent teams of conventional and special operations forces can build local forces capable of handling many situations that previously called for direct U.S. intervention." 29 A concept that was recently developed during Rotation 13-09 at the Joint Fisher.1.indd 20 3/21/2014 12:49:21 PM

Articles in this issue

Archives of this issue

view archives of Military Police - SPRING 2014