Military Police


Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-1 19 Readiness Training Center serves as an example. Leaders and subject matter experts from the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) and the U.S. Army Military Police Corps convened to develop a model provost marshal cell within the Special Forces Command and to construct small, deployable, interoperable teams. Using shared security force assistance experience and branch-specifc knowledge, skills, and abilities, the main effort would focus on assessing and developing culturally attuned national and strategic policing capabilities to support mission objectives and to build partner nation capacities for security, governance, and the rule of law. The growth of capability and capacity could include— but would not be limited to—the areas of public safety, emergency response, police management, and anticorruption. This example highlights two interesting points: y With regard to operational art, the suturing of special operations forces and military police provides a unique means to achieve success with decisive points along multiple LOEs during multiple phases of operation. y With regard to proactive engagement and a seventh warf ighting f unction, deployable special operations forces/military police teams are applicable throughout the range of military operations and are probably most effective when used early in the process. Diligent and careful extrapolation to derive specifcity in the approach to the human domain is surely forthcoming. However, certain truths are evident. First, it is necessary to understand that "When we have formally studied the lessons of our wars and anticipated the demands of the new order that historically follows those wars, we have been successful in subsequent conficts." 31 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and operational art serve as means to frame and visually model a way to view the human domain. Critical and creative thinking are essential. Second, whether by populace-supported legitimacy or by coercion, irregular opposing forces consistently dominate within the human domain, as their operations often align with the most basic of human needs. Looking forward, further complexity of the strategic environment can be expected due to the "rising velocity of human interaction (e.g., through the Internet, Twitter®, Facebook, and other social media), multiplied by the ever-increasing numbers of people in constant close association (urbanization)." 32 Third, leaning forward, the joint force is now working to develop concepts such as the articulation of a seventh warfghting function and interdependent and interoperable teams capable of producing successes in multiple forms to better engage in a complex operational environment. Ultimately, we must truly believe that "thinking is free." 33 To that end, we must be exhaustive, inventive, and aggressive; our adversaries surely are and will continue to be. Endnotes: 1 "Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills," white paper, Strategic Landpower Task Force, May 2013, , accessed on 30 January 2014. Figure 2. The elements of combat power (Adapted from ADRP 3-0) 30 Fisher.1.indd 21 3/21/2014 12:49:22 PM

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