Military Police

SPRING 2014

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/289743

Contents of this Issue

Navigation

Page 46 of 55

MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-1 45 for Soldiers to prepare for a specifc operation. The go bags should contain standard work items (such as uniforms, socks, boots, and helmets) and personal items (such as foot warmers, phone chargers, and anything else a Soldier might wish to have). Go bags could become part of the inventory that platoon sergeants and platoon leaders rapidly check before extreme weather seasons occur. A standardized packing list and a list of desirable sensitive items (radios, maps, thermal/night vision equipment, digital camera, pens, dry erase markers) for a tactical operations center might be a practical means of enabling the leading elements of the operation to rapidly arrive, prepare, and enter the disaster area with a minimum number of forgotten items. The objective of preparing for DSCA operations is a unit that can rapidly activate, organize, and deploy to the operational area with everything necessary to get the job done. When a unit arrives at a disaster area, it is likely to be greeted with near or complete chaos. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many military and civilian chains of command were disrupted for jurisdictional, infrastructural, or communication reasons. Such disruption puts junior offcers in a position where they must glean facts and directives from multiple military and civilian chains of command. The most effective way to handle chain-of-command issues is simply to ask the senior-most military member available how to deal with the situation and to whom to report. Regardless of whether the company commander is involved in the operation, the junior leader must remember to keep the company commander and the frst sergeant informed about events and concerns so that they can provide the upper-echelon support that is not infuenced by junior rank. On a more practical note, informing company leaders provides personnel and logistic support that is not immediately available in the disaster area. If the disaster drags on for weeks or months, company leaders can provide replacements for Soldiers and vehicles. In short, to accomplish the mission, leaders on the ground must be able to quickly grasp the complicated military/civilian chains of command present in the disaster area while also keeping the existing (but not necessarily present) chain of command in the rear apprised of the situation on the ground. Junior leaders must not shy away from making decisions— even unsavory ones. Instead, they should brainstorm with other junior leaders and solicit the opinions of senior enlisted advisors—especially before implementing anything that will signifcantly affect the mission. One DSCA contingency for which many junior leaders fail to prepare is that something will go wrong. Whether the problem entails an injured Soldier, a fatality, or a damaged vehicle, junior leaders must be prepared for the impact on Soldier morale and for the fallout from above. Leaders must be ready and able to face their Soldiers and to support them in recovering from any setbacks—including submitting requests for chaplain support, if necessary. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, junior leaders must also communicate with higher headquarters and complete whatever sworn statements; Department of Defense (DD) Forms 200, Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss; or other documentation that is needed to proceed with the mission. 1 Access to computers, printers, copiers, and other infrastructural items make this much easier. In any case, junior leaders are responsible for learning from mistakes and moving forward with operations. With Operation Iraqi Freedom ending and the war in Afghanistan winding down, the National Guard will once again transition to an operational Army reserve rather than remain a heavily deployed component. The focus might again turn toward protecting the homeland and preparing for DSCA operations. Junior National Guard offcers must prepare themselves for very different battlefelds than the ones that they have primarily been facing during the last decade. The new battlefelds will be located in our communities rather than on distant mountain tops. The focus will be on supporting our civilian government rather than on using warrior tasks to close with the enemy. Soldier training should always adhere to the basics, but preparation for DSCA operations should become an increasingly large component of the unit training calendar. Endnote: 1 DD Form 200, Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss, July 2009. At the time this article was written, Second Lieutenant Larkin was a platoon leader with the 29th Military Police Company, Maryland Army National Guard. He was deployed to Garrett County, Maryland, where he commanded a search and rescue task force of military police; state police; and emergency management services, search, and rescue personnel in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy in October 2012. Second Lieutenant Larkin holds a bachelor's degree in business administration and economics from Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland. The author briefs the adjutant general and search and rescue task force personnel at a tactical operations center in Maryland in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. Larkin.1.indd 47 3/21/2014 12:57:24 PM

Articles in this issue

Archives of this issue

view archives of Military Police - SPRING 2014