Military Police

SPRING 2014

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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5 MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-1 I n Iraq and Afghanistan, a generation of offcers grew up solving strategic dilemmas at the company and platoon levels. Well versed in the requirements and responsibilities of an Army at war, this generation must guide the Army into an ever-evolving and uncertain future. In order to navigate through the complexities in front of us, the Army needs capable, adaptable leaders—now more than ever—who champion the Army's strategic purpose and goals. With that, one of the most important discussions over the next few years will be how company commanders understand and implement the Army's central role in strategic landpower. Over the last 2 years, the Army has put a lot of great people to work examining every facet of our training, doctrine, and warfghting capability. We did not do this to examine where we stand today. Rather, all of this effort was aimed at fguring out two things—what kind of Army we will need to meet future challenges and what we have to do to build that Army even as we continue fghting in Afghanistan and remain engaged throughout the world. Much of what we concluded is available in a single, brief document—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept. 1 If you have not read it yet, please do so. I won't summarize an already brief document in this article. Instead, I will discuss how the newest and most vital ideas relate to the execution level—the company. While things have been written about strategic maneuver, nothing has been written about its application at the tactical level. Although some ideas may be new, much of what must be done remains the same—training, standards, and the understanding of the human environment. This is a result of the unchanging character of the Army's basic strategic problem and mission. As in prior eras, as part of the joint force, our Army must retain its ability to protect U.S. national interests, execute any mission assigned to us, and win on any battlefeld around the world. Given our national strategy, we are required to feld an Army capable of waging war decisively. Fielding a ready and responsive force with suffcient depth and resilience to wage sustained land combat is central to our mission, and that force must be able to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. A ready, robust, responsive force deters adversaries, reassures allies and, when necessary, compels our enemies to change their behavior. Maintaining such a force requires high levels of adaptability throughout each echelon of the Army. Only Soldiers with tactical skill and operational fexibility can effectively respond to changing tactical situations in support of our Nation's strategic goals and interests. This is where company commanders ft into the concept of strategic landpower. Much like company grade offcers did in Iraq and Afghanistan, the company commander of the future must be mentally agile enough to thrive within the parameters of mission command. Developing leaders who can do so, while providing clear task and purpose to their subordinates, will be critical to the success of any mission across the range of military operations. Effective Army commanders, including those at the company level, do not use fscal constraints as an excuse for failing to develop the best possible mix of training, equipment, and regional expertise they can within their formations. Rather, they motivate their people and guide their units in a way that makes optimal use of available resources to create adaptive, effective forces. Our Army has three primary and interconnected roles—prevent confict, shape the operational environment, and win the Nation's wars. The company commander has important responsibilities in each of these. Prevent Confict It is prudent here to defne what a confict is. Since the term gets thrown around a lot and attached to a lot of different situations, it is easy to misunderstand the doctrinal meaning. Confict is an armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Irregular forces frequently make up the majority of enemy combatants we face now and may continue to do so in the future. Confict is often protracted, geographically confned, and constrained in the level of violence. Each confict also holds the potential to escalate into a major combat operation. General Robert W. Cone Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander: Leading the U.S. Army Into the 21st Century Cone.1.indd 7 3/31/2014 8:47:06 AM

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