Military Police

FALL 2014

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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MILITARY POLICE . 19-14-2 30 and Major Kate Conkey M ilitary Police Corps training is based on an Army training management system in which leader development and effective training form the cornerstone of operational success. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, emphasizes the commander's responsibility in ensuring that his or her unit employs training doctrine to sustain expeditionary and campaign capabilities through leader, individual, and collective training using the three training domains (operational, institutional, and self-development). 1 Unlike traditional units, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, (commonly known as CID), units have missions, modifed tables of organization and equipment, tables of distribution and allowances, and governing regulations that constrain training opportunities typically associated with the operational domain and require a greater reliance on operational experience to meet training objectives. Those constraints—along with the commander's guidance and the mission of the higher unit— drive the mission-essential task list (METL) and assist the commander in selecting doctrinal key collective tasks on which the unit must train to achieve mission success. This article describes how updating a battalion METL resulted in a signifcant and much-needed change to the overall battalion/detachment METL crosswalk. It does this by providing overviews of the training management process and exclusive missions and authorizations of CID units and subsequently explaining how these variables the adoption of standardized, nontraditional, hybrid CID battalion and detachment METLs, thereby flling the gap between doctrine and the operational environment. The Army operations process provides a common framework to guide commanders in managing leader development and unit training, which begins with a sound analysis of the unit mission and the ability of the unit to accomplish that mission. Additional factors to be considered include the commander's guidance and the mission of the higher unit. All of these considerations assist the commander in selecting mission-essential tasks (METs), or tasks that the unit could perform based on its modifed table of organization and equipment/table of distribution and allowances design. The compilation of these METs results in the METL; however, the METs—not the METL—drive the focus of training. To provide better focus, battalion and detachment commanders should minimize the number of METs and key collective tasks in the unit METL. At the company or battalion level, a MET could consist of a universal joint task, an Army tactical task from the Army universal task list, a combined arms training strategy task, a task from the brigade or higher-unit Department of the Army standardized METL, or a major collective task. Because training time and resources are limited, units cannot train all tasks to profciency at one time; they must mitigate risk through the prioritization of leader and collective tasks most important to mission success. A basic knowledge of the operations process involved in determining a unit METL allows for a better understanding of the application of the process and its variation between a combat support (CS) military police brigade and a CID military police group. The mission, design, equipment, and allowances of these units are distinctly different— as evidenced by their assigned METs. Although both are charged with executing mission command, their tasks and dedicated training time are vastly disparate. When it comes to the development and execution of training plans, the biggest difference is that CID battalions/detachments have neither a modifed table of organization and equipment position dedicated to training management nor the allocated time to train that equivalent CS military police units with a typical training cycle have. The continuous operational requirements of a CID detachment, coupled with the lack of sister unit support or assumption of responsibilities, do not enable a "green" training cycle. CID commanders must prioritize training tasks and accept risk, just as their CS military police counterparts—but to a different degree and impact. CID and CS military police units are modifed table of organization and equipment-deployable units; however, only CS military police units are authorized and equipped to self-sustain in a deployed environment and deploy collectively at the company level. Because CID units are not equipped to self-sustain, they do not transport and secure themselves in a deployed environment; rather, they rely on supported units to provide transportation and security for their investigative operations. This difference has an impact on CID commanders' prioritization of training tasks and acceptance of risk. Greater emphasis is placed on investigative tasks.

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