Military Police

SPRING 2015

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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Solutions To address these weaknesses, military police lead- ers must develop a framework for mandatory information sharing and ensure that the information-sharing programs are properly resourced and manned. There are eight ele- ments that can be used to assess and solve warfghting ca- pability gaps—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities–policy (DOTMLPF-P). 3 This article addresses three of these ele- ments that are essential to improved CRIMINT program development—organization, leadership, and training. Organization The organizational structure of CRIMINT personnel must be adapted to allow for the necessary degree of col- laboration. Although military police and CID operations are organized to be carried out separately, their intelli- gence functions would be better served by the joint analy- sis and creation of intelligence products. The most effective information-sharing efforts would take place in a fusion cell to ensure that both groups received comprehensive intelli- gence about their areas of operations (AOs). To create an effective CRIMINT fusion cell, the organization must be properly funded to provide the needed work space, analyti- cal software, and personnel. The fusion cell must consist of analysts who are employed by CID and the Department of Emergency Services and leaders who can provide those analysts with appropriate priorities and guidance. An ap- propriate chain of command must be established. The chain of command must strike a balance between the unique in- telligence requirements of each organization and the need for collaboration and decisive leadership. The DOTMLPF-P element of organization is closely related to the personnel element. Fusion cells must be staffed with a suffcient num- ber of personnel based on the size of the installation, and 29 MILITARY POLICE . 19-15-1 C riminal intelligence (CRIMINT) is defned as intel- ligence derived from the collection, analysis, and in- terpretation of all available information concerning known and potential criminal threats and vulnerabilities of supported organizations. 1 A category of police intelligence operations, CRIMINT is essential to effective law and or- der operations. Sources of CRIMINT include military police patrols, police engagements, military police reconnaissance and surveillance, criminal in- vestigations, interviews and law enforcement investiga- tions, collected evidence, da- tabase queries, and data min- ing. 2 Some of this information is obtained by military police intelligence analysts, and some of it is obtained by U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) intelligence analysts. To beneft from CRIMINT, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps must develop a framework that mandates and facilitates robust information sharing between military police and CID intelligence personnel. If timely information sharing fails to occur, both organizations will suffer from preventable information gaps that hinder their understanding of criminal threats. Weaknesses There are several systemic weaknesses of the cur- rent Army CRIMINT program. For example, CRIMINT is rarely emphasized by leaders, which means that intelligence collection is seldom a priority for patrols and that intelli- gence products created by military police and CID intelli- gence analysts do not often operations. In addition, intelligence products are inconsistent within and between installations. Existing information-sharing programs were developed on an ad hoc basis; they are unique to individual installations, and there has been no formal attempt to repli- cate structures or best practices. "To beneft from CRIMINT, the U.S. Army Mili- tary Police Corps must develop a framework that mandates and facilitates robust informa- tion sharing between military police and CID intelligence personnel."

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