Military Police

FALL 2015

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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Fall 2015 9 Eventually, investigators decided to attempt to estab- lish contact with the occupants of the specifc room; how- ever, knocking on the door elicited no response. The Soldier who was assigned to the room arrived at the barracks and entered the stairwell, presumably after a night of drink- ing. When asked to open the door for a search, he claimed that there was no one inside and he refused to comply. His uncooperative behavior continued, turning violent when he kicked a CID agent. Remaining combative, he resisted ap- prehension; refused to be searched; and spouted off a string of obscenities to those around him, including garrison DES personnel. The Soldier was transported to the Vilseck mili- tary police station, where he continued to be combative. Due to the threat that he had presented to himself and others, he was secured in the detention cell. The garrison command- er was briefed, and an in- cident command post was established in an adjacent conference room. The assistance of the German Polizei (po- lice) was requested, and a patrol was dispatched. The pa- trol quickly reported that the situation required additional resources. There was probable cause to believe that the subjects were barricaded, and a formal request for special reaction team (SRT) support was made to the German au- thorities. This triggered a massive Polizei response, which is particularly noteworthy since garrisons in Germany are exempt from the regulatory requirement to maintain SRTs and, given the nature of the offense, concurrent jurisdiction existed. 1 A German security platoon, incident command staff, a hostage negotiation team, special investigators, and techni- cal support staff were dispatched from the Polizei directorate in Regensburg, Germany. Members of an elite Spezialein- (SEK), a Tier 1 German SRT, simultane- ously began to recall and deploy from their bases in north- ern Bavaria. The decision to employ the SEK was based on agreements between the garrison and the host nation. 2 The nature of dangerous suspect apprehension and precision, high-risk entry for barricaded persons doctrinally calls for the employment of an SRT; and all response requirements were met. 3, 4 In the command post, plans regarding the best way to make contact with the subjects and, if necessary, how to properly use the SEK were made. Marksmen were employed and directed to specifc exterior windows for observation. The SEK began rehearsing in similar barracks rooms that were available nearby. The German security platoon relieved interior and exterior cordon military police, and the forces seamlessly interfaced and established liaisons. Blueprints of the hallway and the room were obtained. CID agents worked with the hostage negotiation team to establish a strategy. Incident command remained with the garrison commander and DES, in close cooperation with the SRT-trained 2CR provost marshal. While the SEK began moving into the barracks, up the stairwells, and into the hallway on the third Ger- man marksmen reported movement in the room, which was visible through the windows. As the SEK, embedded with military police and CID agents, approached the door, the members were informed about the movement and the team attempted to make contact with the subjects. Following a knock on the door and identifcation as police, one of the oc- cupants opened the door slightly. Without hesitation, the occupant was taken into custody and questioned. Although the door had been closed, the second subject opened it again to look out. Upon seeing the SEK, he attempted to forcefully close the door, but the SEK managed to enter and secure the room. By 0930 on 5 July, the subjects' identities were confrmed. All host nation elements cleared the scene. Control of the crime sites was then passed from DES to the CID special agent responsible for evidence. The highly complex scene encom- passed six different sites, including the tree line where the weapon that was used in the initial attack (a martial arts sword known as a Kwan Dao) was recovered. Although the CID investigation initially focused on the assault, it ulti- mately led to the exposure of a larger, drug-related ring. The original assault was linked to a dispute regarding a subject's privately owned vehicle and a narcotics operation. The victim had sustained serious lacerations to the thigh, but would recover without permanent injuries. No other in- juries or property damage were incurred during the volatile operation, and the overall outcome was optimal. Media coverage over the following days described details of the cooperation between U.S. military authorities and host nation offcials. The German public prosecutor's offce in Amberg acknowledged that, while the military police and Polizei work together well and closely, incidents involving an SRT are extremely rare. 5 The strategy of mutual sup- port paid off, and standard procedures that had been agreed upon worked as planned. Agencies do not work in a vacuum. Highly professional Polizei forces offer diverse capabilities that exceed those of the garrison. Even before this Independence Day incident occurred, host nation enablers, including SEK, constituted a critical part of the crisis response plan. In the years that followed the incident, additional training exercises beyond routine, full-spectrum, and antiterrorism force protection training were launched. SEK teams frequently train at the garrison, where military police personnel work with them on tactics and procedures. Close relationships between regimental Polizei leaders and a dedicated liaison element permanently based at the military police station have paid dividends. The Independence Day incident not only resulted in a positive operational outcome and the validation of con- fdence between law enforcement communities, but also led "A German security platoon, incident com- mand staff, a hostage negotiation team, special investigators, and technical sup- port staff were dispatched from the Polizei directorate in Regensburg, Germany." (Continued on page 12)

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