Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.
Issue link: https://militarypolice.epubxp.com/i/567773
26 MILITARY POLICE By Lieutenant Colonel Brian D. Heverly, Captain Jimmy Hannabass, and Master Sergeant Lonnie J. Norris I n late September 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) learned of its next rendezvous with destiny. This time it would not be in the mountains of Afghani- stan with violent extremists or improvised explosive device- planting terrorists lurking in the streets of Fallujah. This mission would be in western Africa, conducting humani- tarian assistance and disaster relief operations to counter the Ebola virus. An appeal from Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to President Barack Obama led to the rapid selection and deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to lead Joint Forces Command−United Assistance (JFC-UA) in direct support of the lead federal agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Once again, the Mili- tary Police Corps rapidly responded to Assist, Protect, and Defend outside of our national borders in support of our Na- tion's defense. A task force of 2,600 Department of Defense (DOD) per- sonnel faced new challenges in an expeditionary deployment to build Ebola treatment units, train health care workers, and establish DOD laboratories to test blood samples. The task force also sustained those efforts, provided overarching mission command, and shared their expertise with interna- tional governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Upon completion of those key tasks, the JFC-UA transi- tioned those responsibilities and capabilities to USAID, host nation agencies, United Nations-supported agencies, and international governmental and nongovernmental organi- zations. Major General Gary Volesky, commander of JFC-UA and the 101st Airborne Division, stated that his No. 1 priority was force protection/force health protection. To the 194th Military Police Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, deployed in support of the 101st Airborne Division, this meant that an entirely different set of tactics, techniques, procedures, and skill sets were required in the permissive environment than those honed during the past 13 years of rotating between combat and garrison law enforcement mis- sions. This article examines how the humanitarian assistance mission and the realities on the ground forced the military police to tailor their interaction with the Liberian National Police (LNP). It illustrates how a different type of threat re- sulted in an initially uncomfortable force protection posture. It discusses special training required for the execution of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) certifcation of re- deploying personnel and equipment. And fnally, it explains how the integration of different division staff sections creat- ed a force protection/force health protection team that used assessments as a tool for commanders to keep their forma- tions safe from more than just external physical threats. Before deployment, the task force studied lessons learned from Operation Unifed Response, which was undertaken in the aftermath of the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010. While those lessons provided an overarching direction and tactics, techniques, and procedures for working with other governmental agencies, there were many differences that reduced their usefulness with regard to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Liberia. The DOD was the lead federal agency in Haiti; the Army set priorities and de- termined policy. In Liberia, the DOD operated in support of USAID and its Disaster Assistance Relief Team. The USAID, in coordination with the U.S. ambassador, set pri- orities and the overall way ahead for all U.S. government agency efforts. Additionally, more than 500,000 people were killed or wounded during the earthquake in Haiti, and 1.5 million people were displaced. 1 In Liberia, which has a population of just 4 million, the Ebola virus infected more than 8,400 and killed more than 3,600 since the frst case in December of 2013. 2 So while the physical devastation was more apparent in the case of Haiti, the sense of urgency and desperation was similar. It was estimated that 1.4 million people could be infected with the Ebola virus by January 2015 and that Liberia could cease to exist as a nation. 3 The Haitian government, overwhelmed by the casualties and col- lapsed infrastructure, was unable to care for its people or organize a response. In contrast, the Liberian government remained in overall control of the response, with the Centers for Disease Control, USAID, and other nongovernmental or- ganizations working through a National Ebola Operations Center to execute the bulk of the activities. The Armed Forc- es of Liberia assisted in the completion of four Ebola treat- ment units, and the LNP maintained order through a na- tional election in December 2014. These differences resulted in a different environment than that of Haiti. The JFC-UA needed to understand that to immediately and successfully conduct operations. The LNP is a professional police force capable of executing its duties and responsibilities. While not a completely mod- ern police force, it does receive support and training from the U.S. embassy and the United Nations police. The LNP runs a national training academy that produces 400 police offcers per class, and the LNP leaders are internationally