Military Police

FALL 2015

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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Fall 2015 27 trained. They continue to build their profession with modern training and techniques, using mainly analog equipment. The LNP continually conducts effective community polic- ing and traffc control operations. The administrative record keeping is hand-written, but very effective. The LNP—in- cluding specialized riot, special weapons and tactics, and protection units—receives direct support from the Interna- tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of State. For day-to-day support during the humanitarian assis- tance and disaster relief operations, the LNP (located ad- jacent to DOD nodes) quickly responded to requests for as- sistance with everything from attempted thefts to convoy escorts. It was also key in communicating with the local pop- ulace as decisions were made about Ebola treatment units and mobile laboratory locations. Military police deployed as the only security force for JFC-UA. With little information available before the rapid deployment, the military police quickly identifed and built relationships with local lead- ers. Providing basic policing classes and technical ex- pertise to the LNP was not needed; in fact, host nation security force training is se- verely limited by laws and regulations in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Overall, the LNP far exceeded expectations based on previous deploy- ment engagements with host nation police. It was more than adequate to counter criminal threats. Choosing military police as the JFC-UA security force provided the commander with a level of that no other force is trained or equipped to provide. Crimi- nal threats dominated the threat assessments that were available before the de- ployment and those that were quickly conducted upon ar- rival. The actual environment was far different from previ- ous combat deployments, allowing the JFC-UA to reduce the force protection level and adjust to some tactics, techniques, and procedures that were not initially comfortable for the formation. Military police who were accustomed to carrying weapons in full kit when deployed had to learn to be effec- tive and comfortable with more traditional law enforcement tools in a deployed environment. There were different circumstances for each individual node that the DOD occupied. Across fve nodes, security forces were augmented by personnel from the United Na- tions, host nation security forces, and airport security. It was important not to militarize nodes or disrupt patterns of life developed by the local population before the JFC-UA arrived. One node had a well as a source of drinking water, and another node had a bypass route to a market. As the JFC-UA deployed mobile laboratories to remote locations (collocating with hospitals, other smaller clinics, and even a house in the middle of a village), small teams of military po- lice provided small-unit or site security for each one, work- ing closely with the local LNP. Host nation forces played a large role and took greater responsibility for the security of DOD personnel; at the Barclay National Training Center, JFC-UA Headquarters, the Armed Forces of Liberia pro- vided external security. The JFC-UA provided assistance in personnel accountability for DOD personnel. Liberian forces took great pride in providing security and increased their own force protection posture due to our presence. This kept the force from direct contact with the population (see Figure 1). The military police were assigned the additional mission of executing the USDA certifcation of redeploying personnel and equipment—a task that required training and facilities that differed from those of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol inspections. Although this mission easily falls within mili- tary police competencies, it had not been largely executed in the last 13 years. The military police received certifcations from U.S. European Command instructors. This mission re- ceived great emphasis and scrutiny due to the equipment that was returning after use in combating the Ebola virus outbreak. Because of the lack of sterile areas, the vehicles were cleaned continuously before vessel movement—right up to the point of loading. For similar reasons, container contents were inspected and sealed weeks before movement U.S. perimeter Armed Forces of Liberia Liberian National Police Joint access control points—access control to Armed Forces of Liberia, Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, and U.S. life support area Figure 1.

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