Military Police

FALL 2015

Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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35 By First Lieutenant Natalia P. Brooks T he relationship between brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the military police changed signifcantly with the transition from brigade special troops bat- talions (BSTBs) to brigade engineer battalions (BEBs). Al- though Soldiers are now better able to enhance their knowl- edge of the military police disciplines in organic battalions, the working relationship with the BCT suffered to some de- gree. Joint training at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, highlights the advantages and disad- vantages of being inorganic to the BCT. This article discuss- es the experiences of the 410th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, during its NTC rotation supporting the 2d Armored BCT, 1st Cavalry Division. The 410th Military Police Company was selected to pro- vide support for the 2d Armored BCT decisive action rota- tion about 6 months before execution and immediately began to work with the brigade headquarters to create a parallel training plan. Although efforts were made to conduct joint training before deploying to NTC, BCT training require- ments (including 6 weeks of stabilized gunnery and unit cer- tifcations) severely limited its scope. Despite this setback, the company worked closely with the BCT for as much plan- ning and sustainment as possible. This relationship only grew stronger with the conclusion of the leadership training program, as the 8th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) was assigned administrative control of the company. By align- ing with a battalion rather than directly under the brigade headquarters, information planning, and sustainment drastically improved for the 410th Military Police Company and paved the way for successful integration at NTC. Even though the 410th Military Police Company tied in with the BCT and identifed communication issues early, many of those problems remained unresolved throughout reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; during situational training exercise (STX) lanes; and into force-on-force (FOF) operations. Most of these complications arose because different brigades use different equipment or receive upgrades on the same equipment at different times, making communication between adjacent units diffcult. Al- though the issues were identifed during train-up, failure to conduct a full communications rehearsal with the BCT resulted in overconfdence in system integration. As a re- sult, the communications plan for the company was severely limited when working with BCT assets since the different Blue Force tracking platforms could not communicate. Although FOF training is arguably the most exciting type of training for maneuver units, support and maneu- ver support companies gain far more during STX lanes when they are able to focus on items from their mission- essential task lists. Working with the senior military police observer-controller and the 8th Brigade Engineer Battalion, the 410th Military Police Company established a separate assembly area and training plan for the STX that best suited the needs of the unit. During the course of 6 days, the com- pany was certifed on the following tasks: • React to indirect fre. • React to contact. • Perform company headquarters functions. • Operate a detainee collection point. • Conduct operational area security. • Conduct mobility support operations. • Conduct sustainment operations for all classes of supply. • Execute mission planning. Although this training opportunity was invaluable, it came with some distinct disadvantages that directly impact- ed military police actions in FOF operations. While isolation allowed the military police Soldiers to train largely unfettered, it also kept them largely unaware and uninvolved in planning and movement for FOF opera- tions even in military police areas of expertise, such as the construction of the detainee collection point. When they moved to the BEB tactical assembly area at the conclusion of the STX, they found that the detainee collection point was too close to the BEB tactical operations center and lacked nearby latrines. In addition, the amount of berming and the employment of concertina wire created dead space that in- creased the number of personnel required to safely secure the detainee collection point. If the 410th Military Police Company had been present earlier, leaders would have been better able to shape the plan ahead of time, as they did when the company later jumped to the second tactical assembly area. Fall 2015

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