Military Police


Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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41 Spring 2016 By Captain Michael J. Robey A fter serving as a brigade provost marshal (PM) and observer-coach trainer at the Joint Multinational Training Center, I now realize that there is a sig- nifcant disconnect between the capabilities of military po- lice and the missions to which military police are assigned during direct-action engagements. When military police are used simply for manpower instead of as combat mul- tipliers, the support that they provide to a maneuver bri- gade is greatly diminished. According to the modifed table of organization and equipment, brigade provost marshals are junior captains who do not possess enough experience in military police and staff operations to properly integrate military police forces or advise the brigade commander. If PMs are to be successful in maneuver brigades, they must know how to bridge the gap between fulflling PM re- sponsibilities and providing the commander with support by executing primary staff functions. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 6-0, - tions, PM responsibilities include, but are not limited to— • Conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, including route reconnaissance, surveillance, circulation control, dislocated civilian and straggler control, and in- formation dissemination. • Directing components of area security operations, includ- ing activities associated with antiterrorism operations; zone and area reconnaissance; checkpoint access control; and critical asset, node, and sensitive-material physical security. • Managing, in coordination with the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4), the internment and resettlement of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, dislocated ci- vilians, and U.S. military prisoners. • Coordinating and directing law and order operations, including liaison with local civilian law enforcement au- thorities. • Conducting police intelligence operations, including ac- tivities related to the collection, assessment, develop- ment, and dissemination of police intelligence products. • Coordinating customs and counterdrug activities. As the senior military police offcer on staff, it is the PM's responsibility to learn how the brigade fghts and to know which military police capabilities will support the unit during combat operations. The brigade may need military police to execute only one of its disciplines, but it more com- monly needs them to execute different tasks from the three military police functions (security and mobility support, po- lice operations, and detention operations). Because training resources and time are fnite, it is impossible for military police to simultaneously conduct all military police capabili- ties in an effcient manner; therefore, the PM must conduct an analysis of the brigade mission to determine which re- quirements would be the most benefcial to the brigade mis- sion and should be met by military police. After the analysis is concluded, the PM makes brigade-specifc recommenda- tions on the use of military police. Next, the PM establishes momentum on shaping the use of military police within the brigade. This allows the PM an opportunity to plan military police operations, rather than react to mission sets that have been assigned without a full understanding of military po- lice capabilities and limitations. One way to ensure that military police focus areas are nested within brigade operations is to provide the brigade operations staff offcer (S-3) and executive offcer with a capabilities briefng before meeting with the brigade com- mander. The briefng should recommend focus areas based on expected mission sets and examine military police capa- bilities based on troop allocations or as a whole. The briefng should also assess the ability of military police to shift from one mission set to another. This provides the S-3 and ex- ecutive offcer with a better understanding of military police operations. It also provides the PM with a clearer perception of the brigade needs that can be met by military police. After the briefng, the PM should be able to clearly articulate to the brigade commander which tasks military police should fll and how flling them will beneft the brigade. The PM should understand his or her role throughout the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and know how to align staff planning efforts. During combat training cen- ter rotations, brigades commonly develop planned courses of action without PM integration or input. The prevalent warfghting functions (such as fres and intelligence) are incorporated into the planning process because they are necessary to develop the overall concept of operations. The warfghting functions that encompass the support of the

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