Military Police


Military Police contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations.

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54 MILITARY POLICE command over them and strains the resources necessary to properly support them. As a consequence, military po- lice elements often operate without proper maintenance support, hot meals, and other specifc support that most units receive. To alleviate some of the command support relationship challenges, military police leaders must en- sure that the attaching battalion commander and the BCT operations offcer and provost marshal are aware of general military police and unit-specifc capabilities and understand the importance of coming fully manned and equipped. They must also be prepared to brief unit ca- pabilities at a moment's notice when command support relationships change. This responsibility primarily falls upon the PM. A unit should develop a tested tactical stan- dard operating procedure (SOP) that all Soldiers use during predeployment training. During many JRTC rotations, companies did not have an SOP or they came with a new one on which their Soldiers had not trained. The rigorous operational tempo at JRTC makes it nearly impossible to test a newly created SOP. The SOP must be well known and practiced during the various levels of predeployment training. The latest version of FM 3-63 removed set time limits for holding detainees. The new guidance states that from the point of capture, to the BCT DCP, to the division detainee holding area, detainees must be moved to a safer location as soon as transportation is available. This specifc wording re- quires that internment/resettlement specialists and senior leaders understand that failure to promptly move detainees when transportation is available could be seen as failing to safeguard the detainees. The Geneva Conventions state that enemy prisoners of war (which includes all detainees until they are assigned a proper legal status) must be safeguarded from violence to the greatest extent possible. FM 3-63 sup- ports this by moving from strict timelines to more general guidance to move detainees to safety as soon as transporta- tion is available. This gives units the latitude to safeguard and speed the detainee processes more effectively. The PM must communicate this guidance to BCT leaders through all available channels before rotations and training events. This will allow the brigade to develop an SOP that properly covers detainee movement, processing, and treatment from the point of capture through transition from the DCP to the detainee holding area. Possible friction from limited or de- graded communications must be addressed and exercised before the forcible-entry event to ensure the integrity of the communications plan. Facility commander responsibilities at the DCP are dis- cussed at length in FM 3-63. It is imperative that military police leaders and internment/resettlement specialists un- derstand the responsibilities of the facility commander. When a military police company is not deployed to a rotation, the military police platoon is attached to a company element and is usually directed to run a DCP as one of its tasks. This is a good use of resources, but it still involves the BCT DCP under the command of the BCT commander. Although not directed in doctrine, the frst commander in the chain (usu- ally a BEB or infantry headquarters company commander) becomes the commander of the DCP. It is important that military police subject matter experts brief these command- ers on their responsibilities and on the importance of the proper operation of the DCP. Leadership at the junior commissioned and noncommis- sioned offcer (NCO) levels suffers from limited knowledge of, and experience with, true feld craft. This is an Army- wide issue that comes to light in combat training centers and other challenging training events. At the team, squad, and platoon leader levels, offcers and NCOs are not prop- erly developed to conduct even basic leadership tasks such as precombat checks and precombat inspections. Most Sol- diers are unaware that there is a difference between the two. Young leaders either rely on their experiences in Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments or on lessons learned by others from those deployments. The Army is now focusing on the concept of a DATE, and many of the principles and lessons learned in years of unifed land operations in the Middle East do not apply. Tactical skills and feld craft are not well known and are not being passed down from senior leaders through realistic feld training and leader professional development. Movement Techniques Although mounted movements are generally well trained and performed, weak dismounted movement skills is another A military police fre team guards the perimeter of the brigade main command post during a direct-fre engagement with enemy forces.

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